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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SHOCKING RESULTS:
UPHOLDING THE PROHIBITION AGAINST THE
CIVILIAN POSSESSION OF ELECTRICAL
WEAPONS-COMMONWEALTH

V. CAETANO, 26

N.E.3D 688 (MASS. 2015), VACATED AND
REMANDED SUB NOM. CAETANO V.
MASSACHUSETTS, 136 S. CT. 1027 (2016).
The Second Amendment of the United States Constitution provides
citizens with the right to keep and bear arms, and that the right shall not be

infringed upon.1 Massachusetts has incorporated similar language under
A17 of the commonwealth's Declaration of Rights, instructing that the
2
people have the right to keep and bear arms for the common defense. In
Commonwealth v. Caetano,3 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

("SJC") considered whether Massachusetts General Law chapter 140,
section 131J, prohibiting public possession and sale of an electrical
weapon, is an infringement upon an individual's Second Amendment right
to bear arms. 4 The court determined, in light of other options providing for
an individual's self-defense, that the statute enacted by the Massachusetts
Legislature did not violate the Second Amendment of the Constitution.
On the afternoon of September 29, 2011, the Ashland Police
Department was dispatched to a local supermarket to investigate a possible
shoplifting incident. 6 Ashland police were informed that the store manager

1 See

U.S. CONST. amend. II ("A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a

free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.").
2 See MAss. CONST. pt. 1 art. XVII ("The people have a right to keep and to bear arms for
the common defense. And as, in time of peace, armies are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to
be maintained without the consent of the legislature; and the military power shall always be held
in an exact subordination to the civil authority, and be governed by it.").
3 26 N.E.3d 688 (Mass. 2015) [hereinafter Caetano I].
4 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, § 131J (2004) ("No person shall possess a portable device
or weapon from which an electrical current, impulse, wave or beam may be directed, which
current, impulse, wave or beam is designed to incapacitate temporarily, injure or kill, except: (1)
a federal, state or municipal law enforcement officer, or member of a special reaction team in a
state prison or designated special operations or tactical team in a county correctional facility ...
."); Caetano 1, 26 N.E.3d at 689-90 (arguing stun guns are arms for the purposes of the Second
Amendment).
5 See Caetano 1, 26 N.E.3d at 695 ("Barring any cause for disqualification the defendant
could have applied for a license to carry a firearm. In addition, again barring any disqualification,
possession of mace or pepper spray for self-defense no longer requires a license.").
6 See id. at 689 (providing background information).
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suspected Jaime Caetano and another individual were responsible for the
shoplifting. As the officer on the scene questioned both suspects, Caetano
consented to the officer's request to search her purse.8 During the course of
searching Caetano's belongings, officers found an operational stun gun. 9
Caetano informed the officers that the stun gun belonged to her, but it was
only for defensive purposes.10
Police arrested Caetano, and the
Commonwealth charged her with possession of a stun gun.11
At the trial court level, Caetano filed a pre-trial motion with the
12
Framingham District Court requesting dismissal of the pending charge.
The district court denied Caetano's pre-trial motion, and a jury-waived trial
was subsequently held. 3 Caetano was found guilty in the Framingham
District Court for possession of a stun gun.14 Rather than move directly to
sentencing, the district court judge, with Caetano's consent, placed the case
on file. 15 The case remained on file for approximately two and a half
months prior to Caetano filing a written objection requesting that the court
move for the imposition of sentencing. 16 Following the request, Caetano

7 Id. At this point, Caetano was sitting in a parked car within the store's parking lot with an

unknown gentleman. Id.
8

Id.

9 See Substitute Brief and Record Appendix for the Defendant on Appeal from the
Framingham Division of District Court Department at 4, Commonwealth v. Caetano, 26 N.E.3d
688 (Mass. 2015) (No. SJC- 11718) (reporting facts of the case). The officer described the device
as a "small black device, with two prongs and a trigger mechanism." ILd. From his training and
experience, the officer testified that he recognized the device to be a stun gun. Id. Further, the
officer testified that, when he pressed the trigger mechanism, "an electronic current passed
between the two prongs on the stun gun itself." Id.
10 See Caetano 1, 26 N.E.3d at 689 (describing Caetano's prior abusive relationship).
11 See id. (explaining background history). See generally, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, § 131J
(2004) (detailing penalties for violating law). The statute punishes an individual found guilty of
violating the law by imposing a fine not less than $500, but not to exceed $1000. Id. The statute
also permits the court to sentence an individual for a term not less than six months, but not more
than twenty-four months. Id.
12 Caetano 1, 26 N.E.3d at 690 (arguing possession of stun gun for self-defense is protected
by Second Amendment).
13 id.
14

id.

15

See id. (indicating judicial discretion for placing cases on file); see also MAss. R. CRIM. P.

28(e) (2015) ("The court may file a case after a guilty verdict or finding without imposing a
sentence if the defendant and the Commonwealth both consent."); MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, §
13 1J (detailing penalties for violating law) ("Whoever violates this section shall be punished by a
fine of not less than $500 nor more than $1,000 or by imprisonment in the house of correction for
not less than 6 months nor more than 2 1/2 years, or by both such fine and imprisonment.").
16 See Caetano 1, 26 N.E.3d at 690 (highlighting disagreement amongst counsels).
In
requesting sentencing, the Commonwealth moved for the imposition of a fine; however, neither
side could come to an agreement as to the amount of the fine. d. Due to the disagreement, and
to preserve the defendant's right to appeal, the court placed the case back on file. Id.
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1
filed for further appellate review, which the SJC granted. 7
The Second Amendment has been regarded as a fundamental right
enshrined in our history since before the Nation's founding.18 The United
States Supreme Court has taken the judicial discretion to shape the scope
and applicability of the Second Amendment in an interpretive manner that
balances the intent of the framers, while also measuring the temperament of
society. 9 In 2008, the Court's decision in District of Columbia v. Heller 20
significantly expanded the Second Amendment as an individual right
conferred upon the people.21 In guaranteeing the right of individuals to
possess firearms for their defense, or the defense of their homes, the Court
cautions that the newly conferred right is not one that is unlimited.22 The
Court does this by providing a narrow stipulation that only those weapons
not considered "dangerous and unusual" and those "used by law-abiding

citizens for lawful purpose" are inclusive of the Second Amendment
protection. 23

17

In 2010, with McDonald v. City of Chicago,24 the Court

See id. (explaining appellate jurisdiction).

18 See Kyle Hatt, Note, Gun-Shy Originalism: The Second Amendment's OriginalPurpose in

District of Columbia v. Heller, 44 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 505, 506-09 (2011) (discussing history of
Second Amendment pre-Heller).
19 See generally United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) (defining meaning and
scope of Second Amendment). In Cruikshank, the Court reasoned that the Second Amendment
was not a right conferred upon the people, but a right that should not be infringed upon by the
Congress. Id. at 553; see generally U.S. v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 182-83 (1939) (upholding
constitutionality of National Firearms Act). In making its determination, the Miller Court
essentially permitted Congress to regulate possession of certain types of weapons. Id. at 178-79.
The Court reasoned that:
In absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a "shotgun
having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length" . . . has some reasonable
relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot
say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an
instrument.
Id. at 178.
20 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
21 See id. at 635 (holding Second Amendment covers individual's right to possess firearm
for self-defense purposes). While the Court annulled the District of Columbia's law prohibiting
individuals from possessing handguns within their residences for self-defensive purposes, the
Court also mandated that the District of Columbia permit Heller to register his firearm and to
have a license to possess his firearm in his residence. Id.
22 See id. at 626 ("Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not
unlimited. From Blackstone through the 19th-century cases, commentators and courts routinely
explained that the right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner
whatsoever and for whatever purpose.").
23 See id. at 626-27 (providing constitutional validity for certain limitations).
While the
Court indicates its list is not exhaustive, the Court stipulates that previous prohibitions on
permitting the possession of firearms by those individuals that are mentally ill or are convicted
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solidified their Heller decision by affirming that the Second Amendment is
applicable to the individual states.
Through this expansion, both the lower federal courts and state
jurisdictional courts are simultaneously left with the discretion of
determining the interpretation of "dangerous and unusual" until the
Supreme Court decides to intervene. 26 Many jurisdictions, and their courts,
have varied on the interpretation of what weapons or category of weapons

constitute as "dangerous and unusual," and whether those instrumentalities
either fall within or outside of the scope of the Second Amendment. 27 In
addition to the Supreme Court's judicial discretion, the Heller court
recognized that the Second Amendment was enacted, and ratified, at an
early stage in the Nation's history and draws inference that perhaps the
Second Amendment, like other Amendments granting individuals certain
rights or privileges, may evolve with technology not envisioned by the
framers. 2 1 In particular, this affects whether non-lethal items, like stun

felons are constitutional. ld. Further, the Court recognizes the constitutional validity of laws,
whether state or federal, which regulate the possession of firearms in sensitive buildings, such as
government buildings or schools. ld. Lastly, the Court recognizes the individual states' ability to
implement laws that impose conditions or qualifications on the commercial sale of firearms. ld.
24 561 U.S. 742 (2013).
25 See id. at 767-70 (holding Second Amendment equally applicable to States by virtue of
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause).
26 See id. at 790 (conceding limitations on state legislative freedom). The majority opinion
agrees with Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion that going forward, the legislative abilities of the
states to regulate firearms will either be constrained or limited by the Heller decision. Id.; see
Michael C. Dorf & Erwin Chemerinsky, Three Vital Issues: Incorporation of the Second
Amendment, FederalGovernment Power, and Separation of Powers, 27 TOURO L. REv. 125, 138
(2011) ("Until the Supreme Court makes this determination, it is left to the lower courts to
struggle and decide which gun laws are constitutional and which are unconstitutional."); see also,
Hatt, supra note 18, at 517 ("Heller suffers from an analytical incoherence caused by the meeting
of judicial philosophy and political reality.").
27 See People v. Liscotti, 162 Cal. Rptr. 3d 225, 227-28 (Cal. App. Dep't Super.
Ct. 2013)
(holding possession of "billy" not protected under Second Amendment). But see State v.
DeCiccio, 105 A.3d 165, 178, 181 (Conn. 2004) (holding civilian possession of police baton and
dirk knife within Second Amendment scope); see also State v. Geier, 484 N.W.2d 167, 171 (Iowa
1992) (viewing stun gun as dangerous weapons based on intent and purpose). See generally,
Commonwealth v. Appleby, 402 N.E.2d 1051, 1057 (Mass. 1980) (affirming meaning of
"dangerous weapon" dependent on "context in which it is used."); Commonwealth v. Farrell, 78
N.E.2d 697, 702 (Mass. 1948) ("A dangerous weapon, in legal definition, is any instrument or
instrumentality so constructed or so used, as to likely produce death or great bodily harm.").
28 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 582 (explaining scope of individual rights in modern
times).
Some have made the argument, bordering on the frivolous, that only those arms in
existence in the 18th century are protected by the Second Amendment. We do not
interpret constitutional rights that way. Just as the First Amendment protects
modern forms of communication, and the Fourth Amendment applies to modern
forms of search, the Second Amendment extends to all instruments that constitute
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guns and tasers which are used for self-defensive purposes, are actually
arms and can be considered for protection under the Second Amendment.29
Additionally, non-lethal weapons are a relatively new innovation in
comparison to firearms, but have remarkably changed since their inception
as a tool for law enforcement officials.30 However, even in Heller, the
Court determined that the scope of the Second Amendment might not be

bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of the founding.
Id. (internal citations omitted); see Craig S. Lerner & Nelson Lund, Heller and Nonlethal
Weapons, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1387, 1394 (2009) ("The emergence of new technologies involving
nonlethal weapons suggests that there is a very real possibility that Heller may soon be used to
produce results that undermine the purpose of the Second Amendment.").
29 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 584-85 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("'[T]he Constitution's Second
Amendment ...indicate[s]: "wear, bear, or carry ... upon the person or in the clothing or in a
pocket, for the purpose... of being armed and ready for offensive or defensive action in a case of
conflict with another person." (quoting Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125)); see also A.J.
Peterman, Comment, Second Amendment Decision Rules, Non-Lethal Weapons, and SelfDefense, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 853, 863-64 (defining electrical weapons); Eugene Volokh,
Nonlethal Self-Defense,(Almost Entirely) Nonlethal Weapons, and the Right to Keep and Bear
Arms and Defend Life, 62 STAN. L. REV. 199, 207-08, 218 (2009) (questioning classification of
non-lethal devices as arms). People may be reluctant to possess or carry lethal weapons for the
following reasons: (1) religious or ethical compunctions about killing; (2) emotional availability
to pull the trigger on a deadly weapon; (3) concerns of erroneously killing an innocent party; or
(4) fear of consequences. See Volokh, supra, at 207-08 (expounding reasons for owning nonlethal weapons); see also Lerner & Lund, supra note 28, at 1388 ("Kyllo v. United States,
however, shows that it is not always silly to wonder whether the Constitution applies to novel
devices that were unknown at the time of the framing."). But see Friedman v. City of Highland
Park, 784 F.3d 406, 411 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S.Ct. 447 (2015) (reasoning certain
Second Amendment prohibitions do not diminish defensive options).
30 See ATF Meaning of Terms, 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 (1976) (classifying Taser and stun guns as
firearms). At its earliest inception, the Taser expelled a projectile by means of an explosive. Id.
The federal government, through the ATF, opted to classify the Taser as a firearm since the
expelling function of the Taser fit the definition under the National Firearms Act. Id.; see Bruce
Weber, Jack Cover, 88, Physicist Who Invented the Stun Gun, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/16/us/16cover.html? r=l (highlighting original intent and
purpose of stun guns). Stun guns were envisioned as a non-lethal option for law enforcement
officials, in response to current events in the 1960s, one being airline hijackings. Id; see TASER®
VS.
STUN
GUNS,
STUN
GUN
DEFENSE
PRODUCTS,
http://www.stun-gun-defenseproducts.com/buy-stun-gun/taser-versus-stun-gun.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2015) (providing
descriptions of each weapon). The difference between stun guns and Tasers are the following:
Stun guns are close proximity self-defense devices that use high-voltage electricity
to stop an attacker by momentarily disabling muscle control. [Compared to] Taser
devices [which] are electroshock weapons that use electrical current to disrupt
muscle control, stopping an attacker dead in their tracks. Taser devices can be used
both close and far range. Upon firing, Taser devices shoot two metal probe darts a
distance of 15 feet to reach an attacker before he reaches you. The Taser can also be
used as a direct contact stun gun, allowing for close proximity self-defense.
Taser®vs. Stun Guns, supra.
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conferred to certain weapons, specifically in light of their growing use or
implementation by either law enforcement or the military."
Although forty-three states permit non-lethal electrical weapons,
like Tasers and stun guns, a few remaining states, including Massachusetts,
prohibit their use.12 Even as a majority of states have accepted the idea of
their citizens using electrical weapons, those citizens are not turning to
electrical weapons in comparison to firearms.3 3 Additionally, even as those
states are permitting the use of this class of weapons, many states have
taken the opportunity to list them as dangerous weapons, or require

31

See Heller, 554 U.S. at 627-28 ("Indeed, it may be true that no amount of small anus could

be useful against modern-day bombers and tanks. But the fact that modern developments have
limited the degree of fit between the prefatory clause and the protected right cannot change our
interpretation of the right."); see also Friedman, 784 F.3d at 410-11 ("Some of the weapons
prohibited by the ordinance are commonly used for military and police functions; they therefore
bear a relation to preservation and effectiveness of state militias. But states, which are in charge
of militias, should be allowed to decide when civilians can possess military-grade firearms.");
Lerner & Nelson, supra note 28, at 1411-12 ("The presumption that civilians have a right to use
weapons commonly used by the police should be rebuttable by sufficiently strong evidence that a
particular device is suitable for police work but not for civilian use.").
32 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 134-16 (2014); N.J. STAT. § 2C:39-3 (2015); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 140, § 131J (2014); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.01 (McKinney 2013); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
11-47-42 (2012); Volokh, supra note 29, at 211-12 (explaining stun gun ban history). See
generally MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.224a (2012).
33 See WILLIAM J. KROUSE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32842, GUN CONTROL
LEGISLATION (2012), available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32842.pdf (detailing gun
possession in United States). By 2007, 106 million handguns were available for sale or in the
possession of individuals in the United States. Id. at 8. Additionally, between 1988-93, handguns
were reportedly used 2.5 million times for defensive purposes. Id. at 13. According to Eugene
Volokh:
There is no well-organized National Stun Gun Association . . . who fight[s]
proposed stun gun bans. Stun guns are too new and too rare for that. There is no
stun gun culture ... There is no stun gun hunting, target shooting, or collecting that
makes people want to protect stun gun possession ....
Volokh, supra note 29, at 210-11; see Taser Int'l Inc., Form 10-K (Annual Report) (Mar. 21,
2015), http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/TASR/982338744x0x815519/5B316A98-DD914C8F-B6FD-B65535485F53/2014 Form 10-K.pdf [hereinafter Taser Int'l Form 10-K]
(highlighting limited consumer acceptance). In its annual outlook, Taser highlighted that
conducted electrical weapons (i.e., stun guns) have gained limited acceptance amongst consumers
as the result of competition with handguns and other non-lethal weapon options. Taser Int'l
Form 10-K, supra, at 13. However, according to Arming Women Against Rape & Endangerment
("AWARE"), an educational organization in Massachusetts, because a majority of states have
taken the initiative to legalize stun guns, and because numerous law enforcement agencies utilize
the weapon for non-lethal confrontations, there is no way to classify the device as rare or unusual.
See Brief Amici Curiae of Arming Women Against Rape & Endangerment at 16-17,
Commonwealth v. Caetano, 26 N.E.3d 688 (Mass. 2015) (objecting to unusualness factor of stun
guns).
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3
individuals to have a license in order to either carry or purchase them.
Most recently, as a result of the Supreme Court decisions and law
enforcement's use of non-lethal weapons, the Wisconsin legislature chose
to reverse its position and permit the sale and possession of stun guns.15
Whereas recently in Michigan, the state's intermediate appellate court
struck down the state's law prohibiting the possession of electrical weapons
as being unconstitutional.3 6 Massachusetts, however, has only amended the
law once in an effort to benefit law enforcement officials.3 Given the
decisions of Heller and McDonald, the Massachusetts legislature has yet to
consider expanding the opportunity to permit civilian use.38 However, it
should be noted that even as states are permitting civilian and law
enforcement use of non-lethal weapons, questions remain as to the safety
and futility of the weapon.3 9

34 See Peterman, supra note 29, at 877-87 (providing state-by-state non-lethal weapon laws);
see also State Statutes Regarding or Relating to Taser Brand Conducted Electrical Weapons,
TASER INT'L, INC., https://taser.cdn.prismic.io/taser%2F96e5e4e8-692f-4ffl-bffcc5cb2a6ledfa cew-state-statute-chart.pdf (updated Aug.18, 2015) (detailing individual state laws
classifying electrical weapons).
35 See 2011 Wis. Sess. Laws 35, https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2011/related/acts/35.pdf;
Bruce Vielmetti, Stun Guns Now Legal New Law Allows Electronic Weapons, with a Permit,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 26, 2011, http://www.jsonline.com/news/wisconsin/stun-gunsnow-legal-ol36b3o-134545158.html ("Under [Wisconsin's] new law, a permit is required before
buying or carrying a Taser, concealed or not, while a deadly handgun can be openly carried
without a permit.").
36 See People v. Yanna, 824 N.W.2d 241, 245 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012) (holding Michigan law
prohibiting electrical weapons as unconstitutional). The court reasoned that since Heller upheld
handguns for self-defensive purposes nonlethal options, such as stun guns, are less dangerous and
could not be prohibited when handguns are permitted. Id. Additionally, 43 states also permit the
use of electrical weapons, and law enforcement "routinely" uses them; the court reasoned that
stun guns are neither "unusual" nor "rare" weapons. Id. at 245-46.
37 See 2004 Mass. Acts 738 (approving emergency legislation granting certain law
enforcement officials use of electronic weapons); see generally Donovan Slack, Stun Gun Bill
Gaining Ground
Police Shootings Focus of Attention, BOSTON.COM, July 5, 2004,
http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2004/07/05/stun gun bill gainingground?pg=full.
(discussing electrical weapons bill in context with police shootings). The legislation, passed
under an emergency clause to give the law immediate effect, permitted law enforcement officials
to use electrical weapons as a non-lethal recourse. ld. At the time, the city of Boston was
grappling with two police involved shootings and preparing to host the Democratic National
Convention. ld.
38 See H. 2184, 189th Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2015) (amending existing statute to include
county law enforcement). The bill amends current law to include an exemption for county law
enforcement officials thereby permitting them to use electrical weapons in the field. Id.
39 See Erica Goode, Tasers Pose Risks to Heart, a Study Warns, N.Y. TiMES, Apr. 30, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/01I/health/research/taser-shot-to-the-chest-can-kill-a-studywarns.html? r=0 (highlighting recent study on Taser effects); Mark Puente and Doug Donovan,
Shockingbforce: Police in Maryland didn 'tfollow Taser safety recommendations in hundreds of
incidents, THE BALTIMORE SUN, Mar. 19, 2016,

http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/investigations/bal-tasers-in-maryland- story.html
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In Commonwealth v. Caetano, the SJC determined, in light of the
recent Supreme Court decisions, that the Second Amendment did not
confer the protection to electrical weapons, and in particular, stun guns. 40
First, the court reasoned that because the core of the Heller decision
focused on the protection and defense of the home, the crux of the holding
could not be applicable to the present situation since it concerned personal
possession. 1 Second, in taking into consideration precedent on the issue of
dangerous and dangerous per se weapons, the court opined that because
stun guns are solely for the purpose of causing bodily assault or defense,
then it fits as a dangerous weapon. 2 The court also reasoned that because
stun guns were not in common usage during the time of enactment as
compared to firearms, and in essence are considered a modern invention,
then stun guns were obviously not readily adaptable for military use as
compared to conventional firearms, as envisioned by the founders when
drafting the Amendment, and thus are unusual4 3 Providing additional
support for their decision, the SJC concluded that the legislature was
rationally within its right to enact the law because it dealt with the interest
of public health, safety, and welfare. 4 Notably, the SJC recognized that
their decision would prohibit access to a certain class of weapon, but
cautioned that without further guidance its discretion is limited4 5 On

(providing detailed analysis regarding use of Tasers by law enforcement). In what the newspaper
detailed as the first-data analysis of Taser use by Maryland law enforcement officials, the Sun
raised concerns surrounding the growing implementation of the weapon by local police
departments alongside the lack of coherent policies regarding their use. Id.
40 See Caetano 1, 26 N.E.3d at 692 ("Without further guidance from the Supreme Court on
the scope of the Second Amendment, we do not extend the Second Amendment right articulated
by Heller to cover stun guns.").
41 See id. (differentiating conduct of Heller versus Caetano I). The court highlights
the fact
that Caetano was not using the stun gun to defend her home, and therefore, such conduct "falls
outside" of the scope of the Second Amendment. Id.
42 See Caetano 1, 26 N.E.3d 688, 692-93 (Mass. 2015) (explaining precedent case law). In
labeling stun guns as dangerous weapons or dangerous per se, stun guns are essentially placed at
the discretion of the legislature or court to determine their applicability under the Second
Amendment. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Farrell, 78 N.E.2d 697, 702 (Mass. 1948) ("A
dangerous weapon, in legal definition, is any instrument or instrumentality so constructed or so
used as to be likely to produce death or great bodily harm.") (internal citations omitted);
Commonwealth v. Appleby, 402 N.E.2d 1051, 1057 (Mass. 1980) ("the meaning of 'dangerous
weapon' depends ...on the context in which it is used.").
43 See Caetano 1, 26 N.E.3d at 693-94 (providing justification under unusualness factor test).
44 Id.at 694.
45 See id.at 692 ("Without further guidance from the Supreme Court on the scope of the
Second Amendment, we do not extend the Second Amendment right articulated by Heller to
cover stun guns."). Essentially, the SJC conceded that additional challenges to the law may arise,
yet it limited its approach to consider such challenges and implied that it may change its approach
if the Supreme Court heard additional challenges to the Second Amendment or provided
additional guidance. Id.; see Dorf, supra note 26, at 137 (highlighting Supreme Court decisions
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March 21, 2016, the Supreme Court vacated the Commonwealth v. Caetano
decision and remanded it back to the SJC for further consideration.46 In
reviewing the Caetano opinion, the Supreme Court reasoned that the SJC's

interpretation of the term "in common use at the time" as being inconsistent
with the how the Supreme Court interpreted the term in the Heller
decision.
On two fronts, the SJC used the term to justify their rationale
that because stun guns were neither in common use during the enactment of
the Second Amendment nor of longstanding tradition similar to that of
firearms, that stun guns were unusual weapons, and could not have
constitutional protection. 48
With the Supreme Court vacating the decision of Caetano, the SJC
currently has the opportunity to correctly address the complex question of
whether non-lethal weapons, in particular electrical weapons, should
receive Second Amendment protections.49
In undertaking a second
consideration of the legal challenge, the SJC should continue to uphold the
constitutional validity of the law prohibiting civilian possession of electric
S 50
weapons, thereby denying the weapon Second Amendment protection.5
As the Supreme Court highlighted, the primary concern of Heller was the
ability of one to have defensive measures for the protection of hearth and
home; the issue within Caetano is dissimilar because this was for her
personal protection while out in public.51
In considering Caetano's
presents opportunity for additional challenges to Second Amendment).
46 Commonwealth v. Caetano, 26 N.E.3d 688 (Mass. 2015), vacated and remanded sub nor.
Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027 (2016) [hereinafter CaetanoIl].
47 See id. at 1027 ("[T]he explanation the Massachusetts court offered for upholding the law
contradicts this Court's precedent.").
48 See id. (highlighting Massachusetts SJC inconsistency with applying Heller). Compare
Caetano1, 26 N.E.3d at 693 ("For reasons that follow, there can be no doubt that a stun gun was
not in common use at the time of enactment, and it is not the type of weapon that is eligible for
Second Amendment protection."), with District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 624-25
(2008) ("We think that Miller's 'ordinary military equipment' language must be read in tandem
with what comes after: '[O]rdinarily when called for [militia] service [able-bodied] men were
expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at the
time."'), and Heller, 554 U.S. at 582 ("[T]he Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all
instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of the
founding.").
49 See Caetano H, 136 S.Ct. at 1027 (reasoning "in common use" argument provided by SJC
is inconsistent with Heller). The Supreme Court viewed the SJC's reasoning that because stun
guns are of modern invention, such weapons fall outside the scope of the Second Amendment
protection, as being inconsistent with precedent case law. ld. The Supreme Court properly
suggested that the SJC reconsider such reasoning as it contradicts Heller. See id. (remanding case
for further proceedings).
50 See Caetano 1, 26 N.E.3d at 695 (holding Massachusetts General Law chapter 140, section
131J as constitutional).
51 See id. at 692 ("The conduct at issue in this case falls outside the 'core' of the Second
Amendment, insofar as the defendant was not using the stun gun to defend herself in her home,
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conduct, the SJC should continue to be mindful of the circumstances that
led to Caetano's initial contact with law enforcement authorities and how
this affects Heller.5 2 Although the court took into consideration Caetano's
personal circumstances, her decision to rely on a weapon banned by the
Commonwealth, should be no different than when an individual utilizes
any other type of prohibited weapon (i.e., brass knuckles). 3 In light of the
Supreme Court's per curiam decision requiring the SIC to correctly apply
Heller, there should be added concern as to how far states may go with
regulating access to certain types of weapons, while balancing the interests
of an individual's right to choose. 4 While the SJC was correct in its initial
decision to uphold the law, the court was incorrect when it recognized that
it would •deny the 55use of and access to a certain class of weapon for
defensive purposes .
In reconsidering Caetano, the SJC should first focus its reasoning
on the type of weapon rather than a particular class of weaponry that they
are choosing to prevent access to, as the Commonwealth currently permits
the use of other non-lethal defensive weapons. 6 Previous case law has
shown that when a governmental entity simply prohibits the use of, or

and involves a 'dangerous and unusual weapon."') (internal citations omitted).
52 See Substitute Brief and Record Appendix for the Defendant, supra note 9, at 2
(highlighting law enforcement investigating shoplifting complaint); see also Heller, 554 U.S. at
625 ("We therefore read Miller to say only that the Second Amendment does not protect those
weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes .... ").
53 See Caetano 1, 26 N.E.3d at 689-90 (providing factual context regarding Caetano's
personal circumstances).
54 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 790 (2013) (conceding limitations on
state legislative freedom). The majority opinion agrees with Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion
that going forward the legislative abilities of the states to regulate firearms will either be
constrained or limited by the Heller decision. Id.; see Hatt, supra note 18, at 517 ("Heller suffers
from an analytical incoherence caused by the meeting of judicial philosophy and political
reality.").
55 See Caetano 1, 26 N.E.3d at 692 ("Here, we are concerned not with ensuring that
designated classes of people do not gain access to firearms or weapons generally, but rather with
prohibiting a class of weapons entirely.").
56 See id. at 695 ("Barring any cause for disqualification the defendant could have applied for
a license to carry a firearm.... [B]arring any disqualification, possession of mace or pepper spray
for self-defense no longer requires a license."); see also Heller, 554 U.S. at 621 (defining Miller's
holding). Rather, it was that the type of weapon at issue was not eligible for Second Amendment
protection:
In the absence of any evidence tending to show that the possession or use of [a
weapon] at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or
efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment
guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument.
Id. at 622.
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limits access to, a type of weapon, it cannot be the exclusive reasoning for
striking S•
down
57 a particular law when other remedies suffice under the
constitution. Second, in determining the applicability of the scope of the
Second Amendment protection, the Supreme Court turns to whether a
weapon is both "dangerous" and "unusual" and the SIC too should look to
properly address this issue.58 Case law within Massachusetts, and case law
from other jurisdictions, has provided an applicable roadmap to
understanding how courts may classify a weapon as dangerous or
dangerous per se within the Commonwealth.5 9
Therefore, when
reconsidering Caetano, the SJC does not have to look any further than to its
own guidance to correctly categorize the weapon as being dangerous.60
Furthermore, even in light of the SJC's misapplication of the "in common
use" doctrine, which was the impetus as to why the Supreme Court
overturned the Caetano decision, the SJC was not far off in its approach to
addressing the issue. 61 By parsing through the limited guidance provided
in Heller, the SJC needs to understand that the measure of whether a
weapon is unusual is to ascertain whether such weapon is currently in
common use at that particular point in time in which the matter is being
adjudicated. 62 If comparing electrical weapons, like stun guns or Tasers, to

17 See Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406, 411 (7th Cir. 2015) ("Unlike the
District of Columbia's ban on handguns, Highland Park's ordinance leaves residents with many
self-defense options.").
58 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 627("[A]s we have explained, that the sorts of weapons protected
were those 'in common use at the time.' We think that limitation is fairly supported by historical
tradition of prohibiting the carrying of 'dangerous and unusual weapons. "');Lerner & Nelson,
supra note 28, at 1409 ("[T]he Heller language specifically exempting 'dangerous and unusual
weapons' from constitutional protection would be helpful in defending a Taser ban. Tasers are
less rooted in our historical traditions than firearms, less commonly own and used today, and
perhaps in some ways more horrifying than traditional, albeit more lethal firearms.").
59 See Commonwealth v. Farrell, 78 N.E.2d 697, 702 (Mass. 1948) ("A dangerous weapon,
in legal definition, is any instrument or instrumentality so constructed or so used as to be likely to
produce death or great bodily hanm.") (internal quotations omitted).
60 See Commonwealth v. Appleby, 402 N.E.2d 1051, 1057 (Mass. 1980) (affirming Farrell
by providing "... meaning of 'dangerous weapon' depends on the context... used.").
61 See Caetano H, 136 S. Ct. at 1027 ("By equating 'unusual' with 'in common use at
the
time of the Second Amendment's enactment,' . . . the court's second explanation is . . .
inconsistent with Heller .... "). But see Heller, 554 U.S. at 624-28 (". . . men were expected to
appear bearing anus supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at the time.").
Although the Heller Court spends considerable time interpreting the Miller court's use of the term
"in common use," the Supreme Court opted not to provide a simple answer as to what constitutes
"common use." See Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 (failing to define "common use" other than that it "is
supported by the historical tradition"). Therefore, courts are left to their own judicial
interpretation until the Supreme Court provides further guidance on the terminology. Id.
62 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 ("Miller said, as we have explained, that the sorts of weapons
protected were those "in common use at the time." (quoting U.S. v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179
(1939))).
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firearms, and in particular handguns, the Supreme Court has already
provided they are the most popular weapon of choice, and therefore one
easily could put forward the argument that those weapons are in common
usage.6 3 Unlike firearms, there is limited data providing information
regarding civilian ownership, but also limited data from those states that

allow their law enforcement officials to use the weapon in the field.64 In
comparison to knowing the dangers of firearms, there remains an unknown
factor as to the level of dangerousness and risks associated with the use of
electrical weapons, which should give any court pause before deciding to
upend a law that has the potential to place more of these types of weapons
on the streets. 65 Even presenting an argument justifying civilian possession
on the basis of law enforcement, and to a certain degree, military reliance
of non-lethal electrical weapons would be flawed because every weapon
employed by those entities does not automatically equate to access to
civilians, and thereby would not be enough to disqualify the weapon from
being categorized as dangerous and unusual.66
Despite the prevailing trend of other states decriminalizing civilian
possession of electrical weapons, the Massachusetts Legislature too has had
opportunities to provide civilians with access, but at their discretion has
chosen not to. 6 7 Those states that have chosen to permit civilian access

63 See id. at 629 ("Whatever reason, handguns are the most popular weapon chosen by
Americans for self-defense in the home, and a complete prohibition on their use is invalid."); see
also KROUSE, supra note 33 (detailing gun possession in United States).
64 See Volokh, supra note 29, at 212 (highlighting limited statistical information on usage);
see also Taser Int'l Form I O-K, supra note 33, at 13 (highlighting limited consumer acceptance).
In its annual outlook, Taser highlighted that conducted electrical weapons have gained limited
acceptance amongst consumers primarily due to competition with handguns and other non-lethal
weapon options. Taser Int'lForm 1 O-K, supra note 33, at 13.
65 See sources cited supra note 39 and accompanying text.
66 See Lerner, supra note 28, at 1401-02 (discussing developments in non-lethal weapons);
see also Heller, 554 U.S. at 627-28 ("It may well be true today that a militia, to be as effective as
militias in the 18th century, would require sophisticated arms that are highly unusual in society at
large. . . . But the fact that modern developments have limited the degree of fit between the
prefatory clause and the protected right cannot change our interpretation of the right.");
Freidman, 784 F.3d at 410 ("Some of the weapons prohibited by the ordinance are commonly
used for military and police functions; they therefore bear a relation to preservation and
effectiveness of state militias. But states, which are in charge of militias, should be allowed to
decide when civilians can possess military-grade firearms."). But see Brief Amicus Curiae of
Arming Women Against Rape & Endangerment, supra note 33, at 16-17 (objecting to
unusualness factor of stun guns). The advocacy group highlights that because a majority of states
have taken the initiative to legalize stun guns, and because numerous law enforcement agencies
utilize the weapon for non-lethal confrontations, there is no way to classify the device as rare or
unusual. Id.
67 See H. 2184, 189th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2015) (enabling counting law
enforcement officers to possess electrical weapons); see also, 2004 Mass. Acts ch. 170
(approving emergency legislation granting certain law enforcement officials use of non-lethal
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have done so by enumerating various limitations on one's ability to access
the weapon.68 If the SJC were to provide judicial remedy by granting
civilians the use of electric weapons for defense purposes, the court
essentially would undermine the legislature's attempt to regulate the use of
dangerous weapons and would welcome challenges to weapons not
previously considered for constitutional protection.6 9 In light of the limited
guidance provided by the Supreme Court, a reasonable person may argue
that because an instrument is in common ownership and meets the
definition of a bearable arm, it too would constitute as a weapon deserving
of Second Amendment protection.70 At the end of the day, the SJC has to
be cognizant that any hasty judgment by the Court to strike down the law
because of the Supreme Court's per curiam decision resurrects the slippery
slope argument as to how far and wide the Court can stretch the scope of
the Second Amendment in the name of self-defense.
In addition to the
aforementioned reasons, in reconsidering Caetano's challenge, the SIC
should remain aware of the Supreme Court's specific instruction that the
Second Amendment is not an unlimited privilege. 2
Presented with the opportunity to adjudicate whether certain
classes of weapons, such as stun guns, are granted Second Amendment
protection, the Supreme Judicial Court in Commonwealth v. Caetano, made
the correct decision of not extending the scope of the privilege. The
Supreme Court in its precedent case law articulated how far the scope of
the Second Amendment protection should extend to certain classes of

weapons).
68 See Peterman, supra note 29, at 877-87 (providing state-by-state non-lethal weapon laws);
see also State Statutes Regarding or Relating to Taser Brand Conducted Electrical Weapons,
supra note 34 (detailing individual state laws classifying electrical weapons); Vielmetti, supra
note 35 ("Under [Wisconsin's] new law, a permit is required before buying or carrying a Taser,
concealed or not, while a deadly handgun can be openly carried without a permit.").
69 See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 790 (conceding limitations on state legislative freedom). The
Court agreed with Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion that going forward that the legislative
abilities of the states to regulate firearms either will be constrained or limited by the Heller
decision. Id.;see Doff, supra note 26, at 136 (highlighting potential legal challenges facing
courts). As a result of making Heller applicable to the states under McDonald, both federal and
state courts likely will see additional challenges to existing weapons laws. See McDonald, 561
U.S. at 790 (conceding limitations on state legislative freedom); Dorf, supra note 26, at 136
(highlighting potential legal challenges facing courts).
70 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 584-86 (providing meaning of "bear arms").
71 See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 889-90 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The notion that a
right to self-defense implies an auxiliary right to own a certain type of firearm presupposes not
only controversial judgments about the strength and scope of the (posited) self-defense right, but
also controversial assumptions about the likely effects of making that type of firearm more
broadly available.").
72 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27 ("...
was not a right to keep and carry any weapon
whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.").
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weapons, and viewed that the privilege does not guarantee citizens an
unlimited right to possess any weapon for any particular reason. Despite
the SJC overlooking the Heller Court's interpretation of Miller, the court
correctly articulated the reasons as to why electrical weapons should not be
afforded constitutional protection. By upholding Massachusetts General
Law chapter 140, section 131J, the SJC, in continuing the prohibition of
electrical weapons, does not foreclose on opportunities for individuals to
possess other weapons, whether lethal or non-lethal, for self-defensive
purposes.
Kevin L. Corbin

